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Botnets are state-of-the-art malware where most frauds and attacks activities on internet 
are carried out. Bot detection is an active research area in recent times. Most proposals 
are network based detection methods which have lots of drawbacks, where botnet traffics 
and attacks have negligible network visible effects [1], and any minor modification on 
botnet traffic such as command and control (C&C) encryption allows botnet to evade 
detection. This thesis introduce host-based botnet mitigation technique. Our approach is 
statistical anomaly based detection using machine learning classification technique. The 
mitigation methodology is by blocking bot process from sending/receiving network 
traffic to/from its botmaster. Our experiments are based on observing C&C traffic in 
local machine. Special tool used to monitor C&C communications. We named it, Packet 
Capturing Tool (PCTool). Collected data from PCTool are further processed to find 
statistical features of botnet C&C traffic. Then, Support Vector Machine (SVM) training 
using those features to classify malicious and benign process. We had 94.11% success 
detection with false positive rate 0.14 %.   
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Thesis Abstract (Arabic) 
 الرسالة ملخص
 : أحمد منصور عايض العامري ــــــمـاالســــــــ
 ]اكتب عنوان الرسالة[: الرسالة عنوان
 : شبكات حاسب آليــصــالتخصــــ
 6102: مايو رجــالتخ تاريخ
Botnet  ال ت االحتيحيث تتم معظم عمليا و التي تشكل شبكة عبر االنترنت ، البرمجيات الخبيثةهي مجموعة من
 يف هو مجال بحوث نشط البرمجيات الخبيثة  كشف هذه/تحديد .من خاللهاات على شبكة االنترنت الهجم/واألنشطة
والتي لها الكثير المحلية الشبكات في   Botnetكشف على طرق  قائمةالحلول المقدمة /اآلونة األخيرة. معظم المقترحات
 الو تكاد  خرى تصعب مالحظتهابالتطبيقات األلى الشبكات مقارنة ع Botnetحركة تراسل   ن بحيث أ .من السلبيات
لل ( يسمح C & Cالقيادة والسيطرة ) وامرأتشفير  مثل Botnetحركة تراسل أية تعديالت طفيفة على أن و، تذكر
Botnet للكشف عن تقنية  تقدملتهرب من الكشف. هذه األطروحة اBotnet نهجنا هو الكشف   .جهزة المحليةألا في
فيف هي من . منهجية التخالشذوذ من عدمة تصنيفللقدرة على  آللةالذاتي لتعلم الصائي باستخدام تقنية على الشذوذ اإلح
 . تستند تجاربنا على مراقبةBotmaster إلى  الشبكة من /بيانات عن طريق من إرسال / استقبال  Botnetخالل منع 
ستقبال أوامر السيطرة و التحكم إ /حركة تراسل . أداة خاصة تستخدم لمراقبةةالمحلي زةجهفي اال C & C ال حركة
(C&Cسميناها( أ (PCTool) تتم معالجة البيانات التي تم جمعها من .PCTool الميزات  المزيد من لعثور علىل
استخدام تلك الميزات ب SVMتدريب يتم  ثم ومن .Botnetستقبال أوامر السيطرة و التحكم لل إلحركة تراسل/اإلحصائية 




CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 Botnet is a group of infected computers (bots) running software which connect to 
attacker (botmaster) through C&C channel to coordinate fraud and attack activities. 
Botnet is the largest security threat on internet due to the tremendous number of attacks 
which can be held through it such as distributed denial-of-service (DDOS), phishing, 
spamming, malware distributing, information stealing, etc.  
Authors in [2] informed that about 70 percent of distributed spams worldwide come from 
botnets. Furthermore, a prediction says that 25 percent of computers connected to 
internet around the world are bots (around 150 million PCs) [3]. Bot-master sends 
commands to bots through C&C overlay network. As a result, many earlier botnets 
detections proposals especially network-based botnet detection techniques tried to 
exploit this ongoing C&C behavior [4]. 
Since, most infected machines around the world are personal computers (PCs) used by 
home users and are not part of local networks [5], we need a methodology that can easily 
detect bots on single PC. It is assumed on theory that bot program installed on end 
computer will have different outgoing and incoming traffic behavior than benign 
program [4]. There are many proposals used this assumption in their works.  
Our approach is host-based mitigation technique independent of any structure/protocol 




experimental approach is to find common anomaly on bots traffic behavior. Experiments 
are based on observing and comparing traffic behavior of known bots with traffic 
behavior of other benign programs. Packet Capturing Tool (PCT) was built for this 
purpose. The statistical analysis will held after capturing network packets of each 
running process on each machine.  Then, statistics are used as main features to train the 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier. Radial Basis Function (RBF) is used as kernel 
function of SVM. This way, our mitigation technique is based on detection methodology 













1.1  BOTNET LIFE CYCLE: 
 
 
Figure 1: Botnet Life Cycle 
  
Life cycle of botnet begins with infection stage as illustrated in figure 1 where vulnerable 
host is being exploited. When machine gets infected it called bot (zombie). After 
infection, bot binary is downloaded from remote server and automatically installed (step 
2). Then, bot starts DNS lookups (step 3) in order to find C&C server(s) and authenticate 




updated along with C&C servers list. Once infected machines (bots) are online and 
connected to C&C servers, they will be ready to perform botmaster's commands (step 5) 
as soon as they are issued. 
1.2 BOTNET ARCHITECTURE: 
Most botmasters are using command and control (C&C) channel to communicate with 
their bots. Actually, command and control (C&C) communication is the main attribute 
that distinguish botnets among other malicious software’s[6]. C&C is a way that allows 
bot controller to command bot in his botnet to perform one of the previously mentioned 
activities of botnet (distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), phishing, spam, malware 
distribution, information theft, etc.). Botnets use various protocols for its command and 












1.2.1   CENTRALIZED BOTNET ARCHITECTURE: 
In this botnet architecture, C&C channels connect bots to certain C&C servers as 
illustrated in fig (2).  Bots connection to C&C servers is done through various 
methods [7], namely : 
- Hardcoded IP Addresses of C&C Servers: 
The executable file which infects computers has in its binary, lists of IP 
addresses of C&C servers where bots should connect. This can be detected 
easily through reverse engineering [7] . 
- Dynamic DNS: 
According to botmaster's commands bots migrates from one C&C server to 
another using the public DNS service[7]. 
- Distributed DNS: 
This method is same as the Dynamic DNS but they use their own distributed 
DNS service (away from law enforcement)[7]. 





Figure 2 : Centralized Botnet Architecture 
 
1.2.1.1 IRC BOTNETS: 
IRC is very famous public exchange point. It enables virtually instant communication, 
which provides common, simple, low latency, wide availability and anonymity 
command and control protocol for bot communication. IRC network is composed of one 
or more IRC servers. According to botnet design, each bot connects to public IRC 
network or hidden IRC server. Bot receives commands from controller (bot-master) and 
can be instructed to attack. Simplicity and multicast delivery mechanism of IRC protocol 




et al. [8] and Gizzard et al. [9] observed that most easily detected botnets use IRC for 
their C&C communication. They pointed out the weaknesses of IRC botnet because of 
its centralized server architecture. Moreover, IRC traffic is usually unencrypted and once 
the centralized IRC C&C channel is detected by defender the whole botnet could be 
disabled by shutting down central server. 
1.2.1.2 HTTP BOTNET: 
In this architecture, HTTP protocol is used by botnet to make its C&C communications. 
HTTP post and poll mechanism facilitates the work of botnets[10]. Bots use HTTP poll 
for several times to get bot-master commands[11]. In meantime, botmaster uses HTTP 
post to distribute commands then bots do polling from web server. In this way,  it will 
be hard to detect due to difficulty to identify anomaly traffic from normal traffic , as well 
as , HTTP botnet traffic  can easily pass through firewall policies[12]. But when HTTP 
server revealed, it will be easily to shut down the whole botnet[11].   
1.2.1.3 POP3 BOTNET: 
In this architecture, POP3 protocol is used for C&C communications. In POP3 botnet, 
bot is getting commands through retrieving E-Mail message from pre-defined mail 
server. Commands are within E-Mail attachment and responses to commands are 
following the same channel. This way, it will be harder to detect connection than in IRC 





1.2.2   DECENTRALIZED BOTNET ARCHITECTURE: 
In this botnet architecture, each bot can publish command as shown in figure 3. In this 
way, botnet we still be functional even after identification of bot-master and bring it 
down, since, any bot in the decentralized botnet still can issue commands[7]. Peer-to-
Peer botnets is good example of decentralized botnets. 
 






1.2.2.1  PEER-TO-PEER BOTNETS: 
The publish/subscribe system is usually used in peer-to-peer (P2P) botnets for 
communications. Bot-master doesn’t have ability to send commands to bots. Instead, he 
makes set of commands to P2P system and each bot subscribe to this set. When bot-master 
want to launch attack he publish command to the P2P system and subscribed  bots to the 
set can receive it [11]. 
1.3 THESIS MOTIVATION: 
Most infected machines around the world are personal computers (PCs) used by home users 
and are not part of local networks[5]. In addition, network based botnet detection techniques 
suffer from following drawbacks [14][1].   
 Identifying the C&C traffic is very difficult task as C&C traffic is considered to be 
light compared to the legitimate traffic. 
 Minor modification on botnet, such as, C&C traffic encryption, allows it to evade 
detection.  
 Bot attacks have negligible network visible effects [1]. 
 High rate false positive detection leads to blocking on wrong hosts. 
According to [1]  lots of leading botnet detection methods [15][16][6][17] can be evaded 
using simple evasive tactic such as encrypting C&C traffic. Zhang et al. [18] conclouded 





This yields interesting insights to have Host-based botnet mitigation technique independent 
of any structure/protocol, relay on behavior anomaly and statistical analysis with high 
detection rate, law false positive rate, and not easily evadable.     
1.4 THESIS OBJECTIVE: 
Main objectives of this research are as follows: 
1. Conduct research on botnet detection methodology and develop required 
techniques and tools.  
2. Implement host-based botnet mitigation technique with high detection rate, low 
false positives and not be easily evadable. 
3. Proposed technique should independent of any structure/protocol, relay on behavior 
anomaly and statistical analysis.  
1.5 THESIS ORGANIZATION: 
This thesis is organized as in following chapters. Chapter 2 starts with literature review of 
existing botnet detection techniques. Categorization of these techniques is established 
according to many charactristecs such as topology of techniques and targeted component 
of botnet. Chapter 3 provides general description about research problem and how we are 
going to solve it. Chapter 4 discusses development and testing of the tool built to capture 
traffic of certain process. We tested this tool with real experiments, modification done to 
improve performance of the tool. After testing the tool, we built new dataset of malicious 
and benign processes network traffics. This dataset is used in experiments done in next 




in Chapter 5. Finally, thesis is concluded in chapter 6 in which overall research phases is 












CHAPTER 2  
BOTNET DETECTION AND MITIGATION METHODOLOGIES 
In this chapter, we explore previous work done in literature in context of defense against 
botnet. The topic of defense against botnet has been extensively researched in recent years, 
and variety of proposed solutions were produced.  
Defense against botnet can be broadly categorized to botnet detection and botnet mitigation. 
Accordingly, we classified available literatures to one of these categories.   
2.1 BOTNET DETECTION: 
We broadly categorize existing botnet detection techniques in the literature as Host Based 
detection, and Network-based detection. In botnet detection, there is no one technique to 
detect the whole botnet at once [19]. Targeted component of botnet in each category 
fluctuate. In Host-based, detection of malicious process is the ultimate goal. However, 
infected machine (Bot), C&C channel, and Botmaster are the targeted components in 
network-based detection techniques. Literatures actively detecting botnet are not reviewed 






2.1.1 Host-based Detection Techniques: 
In this section, we are going to review host-based botnet detection. Host-based botnet 
detection methods strategically monitor and analyze computer system activities (such as 
system logs, API calling, registry records etc.) internally instead of observing network 
traffic. Main target of these methods is to find the malicious process (Bot process) running 
in system. 
L. Liu  et al. [20]  assumed that each bot has three main features. Firstly, no user intervention 
to initialize bot. Secondly, C&C communication should be established by bot. Finally, 
sooner or later bot should perform an attack. They proposed Bot-Tracer to identify three 
features with help of virtual machine (VM) techniques. This methodology is week against 
the Zero day attack, and bots that check existence of the VM. 
 S. Balram and M. Wilson [14] have proposed host-based botnet detection methodology. 
Users tend to use certain common collections of application to perform normal daily tasks 
for their job, education, or even entertainment. So, normal usage of application will generate 
traffics that belong to certain pattern. The authors [14] in  used this fact to build a profile 
for normal traffic. The profile is built through testing outgoing traffic of a user to a 
destination. The normal profile is initialized with a common destinations list such as 
www.google.com. Then, they add to list the tested flows to every destination. A flow means 
a group of network packets that have the same Destination Port, Destination IP, Source 
Port, Source IP, and Protocol. Flows to destinations are analyzed and destinations which 




host generated traffic into normal traffic and suspicious traffic. This traffic filtering stage 
will reduce the amount of traffic which needs to go to detailed Analysis by 70%. In the 
detailed analysis stage, suspicious traffics are classified to bot or normal. To classify the 
suspicious traffic as bot or normal, method involves analysis of traffic by looking for similar 
flows to a destination domain/IP at periodic intervals which indicate an existence of an 
active bot. Furthermore, periodic failed DNS queries to destination domain, many NetBIOS 
queries to a destination domain/IP, or appearance of many SYN scans in traffic indicates 
an inactive bot (a bot cannot connect to its C&C server). The authors claim of high botnet 
detection rate with low false positive using their real-time detection. However, the authors 
mentioned that their work does not consider IRC or P2P traffics which are widely used by 
bots as a C&C communication. Thus, this method is not a generic botnet detection method. 
Also, in their experiments, processing of traffic to build the normal profile is done on a 
timeslot basis. The time slot considered is only 30 minutes which causes the false positives.  
E.Stinson and J. Mitchell [4] follow the hypothesis that each participating bot independently 
executes each command received over C&C network.  A bot command takes some number 
of parameters (possibly zero) – each of a particular type – in some fixed order. Therefore, 
botnet constitutes remotely programmable platform with set of commands it supports 
forming its API. Many parameterized bot commands are implemented by invoking 
operating system services on host system. Typically, command’s parameters provide 
information used in system call invocation. Thus, execution of many parameterized 
commands causes system call invocations on arguments obtained from those parameters. 




arguments contain data received over network, this occurs when  bot executes  command 
received from its botmaster [4]. This approach performs explicit information flow tracking 
on network data. To distinguish remotely-initiated from locally initiated system calls, the 
method identifies data which is dependent upon local user input and sanitizes such data. 
This method has high false positives, and it degrades the performance of host. 
In 2008, E.Stinson and J. Mitchell [1] proposed BotSwat, which is a tool to monitor 
operating system. Initially, BotSwat scan and monitor Win32 library execution status and 
runtime system calls. Despite botnet C&C architecture, protocols, and botnet structure, 
Botswat tries to find out bots with its general properties. 
 Masud et al. [21]  used a flow based technique where log files of hosts correlated. This 
considered to be an effective host-based methodology. As bots normally respond more 
quickly than humans, mining and correlating multiple log files can be easily realized. It is 
proposed that these techniques can be efficiently performed for both IRC and non-IRC bots, 
by correlating several host-based log files for some C&C traffic detection. 
In MABDS (Multi-agent bot detection system)[22], five agent where used, user agent, 
administrative agent, knowledge database (KnB), system analysis, and honeypot agents. 
The multi-agent technology uses a hybrid technique which combine HIDS (Host based IDS) 
and event log analyzer. Slow interchanging of new signatures with KnB, is the main issue 




Another HIDS was introduced by Ying et al. [23], but they used different techniques. HIDS 
combines back-propagation (BP) neural network and log analyzer. Detection was mainly 
based on misuse. Combination of the two techniques outperform current -at that time- other 
detection systems. But, major issue of this technique was scalability. 
A host-based mechanism was proposed in [24]. This security mechanism can detect onset 
of malicious ware infection through the use of the right rules to apply the right dependency. 
Dependency in this context means, corresponding system event of user behavior. One issue 
of this tool is security, where OS routine can be intercepted by kernel mode routine. 
HIIDS (Hybrid intelligent IDS) [25], applied neural network to mine the definition of 
malicious attacks. Collected information of certain attack behavior goes to decision support 
system. This combination of neural network and decision support system provide efficient 
and accurate detecting technique. But, does not provide autonomous learning in decision 
support system. 
Proposals in [26][27][28], exploited static features of  malicious code by extracting it by 
disassembly techniques. But this method is not effective anymore, due to emergence of 
packers, deformation, and polymorphic techniques.    
API hooking technique and dynamic behavior analysis were exploited in [29][30][31][32] 
to overcome effect of the packers, deformation, and polymorphic techniques. Willems et al. 





The following are some intrusion detection methods which inspired our work away from 
botnet. Somayaji et al. [33], [34] proposed a kernel Linux extension (pH) which monitor 
any executing process and responding to abnormal behavior such as unexpected system-
calls sequence. Once system has enough training on a sufficient number of normal program 
executions. The model will recognize most normal behavior as “normal” and most attacks 
as “abnormal”. 
Microsoft Windows Registry is an essential part of the Windows Operating System , and it 
is significantly used by  programs, which make it an excellent source of audit data [35]. 
Stolfo et al. [35] introduced a host-based Intrusion Detection System(IDS) to observe  
software usage of Windows Registry. They presented a Registry Anomaly Detection (RAD) 
system. RAD uses a machine learning model to learn normal model of accesses to registry 
in real-time and detects actions of malicious software access to registry at run-time. 
2.1.2 Network-Based Detection Techniques: 
In this section, we are going to review Network based Botnet Detection techniques. Unlike 
Host-based detection, Network-based Detection strategically monitor and analyze data 
while passing through medium. In network based detection techniques various parameters 
are being used to perceive malicious traffic through monitoring network traffic. Requests 
and responses of bots traffic tend to have same patterns despite architecture employed. In 
the network-based detection techniques components targeted are Bot (machine), C&C 





2.1.2.1 Bot Detection: 
Bot detection is done without any regards to bot peers/family. This is very important to 
users and network administrators. As their main goal is protecting their computers and 
networks from getting exploited by botnet, without any concern about bot family. Bot 
detection designates existence of vulnerabilities in host or network to be exploited by 
botnet. Then, remedial strategies can take place to recover from infection and precaution to 
avoid the possibility of botnet infection in future. 
Akiyama  et al. [36] proposed the use of relationship, response, and synchronization as a 
three metric that bots within same botnet  have regularities in. This metric is used for botnet 
detection. Relationship between bot-master and bots is one-to-many relationship. When 
bot-master publishes command each bot respond automatically with no mistakes in a way 
that can be different from human responses. Actions of bots after receiving bot-master 
commands are taken at the same time. This synchronization that just accrued can be used 
as botnet detection metric. 
J. Binkley and S. Singh [5] proposed algorithm to detect anomaly traffic of IRC-based 
botnet. This algorithm can detect bots by combining TCP anomaly, and IRC messages 
statistics and tokenization, as well as, can find C&C server. One weakness of this algorithm 
that it is defeated by simple encoding of IRC commands. C. Mazzariello [37] introduced 




activity. They used decision trees in experiments. Despite that the experiments were 
succeed, it was not clear if the success is due to the method or the dataset used. 
Rishi [6] is an IRC based detection and it is pure syntactic(signature based). Snort [38] is a 
famous syntactic tool as well . Syntactic detection can easily be evaded by simple 
encryption and it cannot detect newly emerged botnets. 
However, semantic is superior approach which involves correlation or behavior based 
techniques. In correlation, bot families can be exposed. The idea of correlation techniques 
based on that botnet is an arranged infrastructure, and thus clustering hosts with similar 
activates is applicable. Researchers used correlating email spams to detect similar botnets 
[39].  
Correlation divided to Horizontal and vertical. Horizontal correlation concerned about 
similarities of communication and machines behavior. This way it can detect bots. 
BotMiner[40] lists bots in network by performing cross cluster correlation of Similar 
communication and patterns of malicious activities clusters. BotSniffer [17] detect bots by 
finding similarities of bot families C&C traffic in  local network. The approach was 
basically built on observation that responses of bots in same botnet which are running same 
bot program will be same due to the pre-programmed C&C interaction to bot-master 
commands. This approach comes with very low false positive rate.   
In the literature many proposed methods using similarities of traffic to detect bots [15] [41] 




and duration  searching for the existence  of botnet  C&C activity in order to detect botnets. 
Then, they separate the likely to be botnet traffic from the unlikely to be botnet traffic. The 
likely to be botnet traffic is grouped and correlated to find patterns of communications 
which suggest the activity of a botnet.  A weakness of these methods that it need more than 
one bot from the same botnet in the network monitored to be able to detect the bot.  
In vertical correlation, activities of one host are correlated and compared with bot behavior 
model. BotHunter [43] couple suspicious traffic with intrusion detection activity to 
announce successful bot detection. Bots can escape this method since it is capable of evade 
correlating timings of events to perform local attack. 
In behavior analysis where botnet analyzed by observing the machine/traffic behavior. 
Behavior analysis in network-based detection technique is by network traffic tracking and 
accordingly classifying it into applications traffic, then analyze to find bot-like behavior. 
Classification of network application traffic is not an easy job and it can defeated by 
application using dynamic/random port numbers. Using payload to classify network 
application traffic can be defeated by encryption. Lu et al [44] found that 40 % of traffic 
cannot be classified to application traffic.  
Literatures [45] [16] [6] proposed an IRC-based botnet detection by separating IRC and 
None-IRC traffic. Karasaridis et al. [16] Presented an approach of detecting and 
categorizing botnet. Their approach does not depend on information of certain application 
layer. It is performed on transport layer data using passive analysis. Therefore, it will be 




2% and can detect encrypted botnet communications.  P2P bot traffic can be separated from 
P2P normal traffic based on 1) P2P churn, 2) Flow characteristics, and 3) Human and 
machine behavior[42]. Bots communication in p2p botnet exploited in [46] for detection 
using likelihood ratio. Despite this technique is efficient, it experience high false positive 
rate. 
Others literature detect botnet through analyzing , monitoring, and correlating DNSBL[47] 
, DDNS [48] , and search engine queries [49]. Yu F et al [50] proposed a detection technique 
based on search engine of query logs. Unfortunately, Diverse Search requests are remain 
undetectable.  
In order to avoid detection of C&C server, the bot-masters usually duplicate and move the 
C&C server frequently.  Therefore, in order for bots to locate the current C&C server, they 
use Dynamic DNS (DDNS) queries.  David Dagon [51] introduced a way to detect C&C 
servers by identifying domain names with huge concentrated rate of DDNS queries. This 
approach comes with high false positive, because, a famous domain name with high DDNS 
query rates and short Time-To-Live DNS could be falsely detected as a C&C server. In the 
other hand, A. Schonewille and D.van Helmond [52] introduced an approach which is very 
effective, since it detect numerous suspicious domain names . This approach is based on 
observing the frequent anomalous DDNS responses which indicates that the DDNS query 
was sent to an unavailable domain name. This DDNS replies often correspond to a taken 
down botnet C&C servers. Therefore, PCs which sending such DDNS queries are probably 





2.1.2.2 C&C Channel Detection: 
C&C Channel detection is very important to understand botnet behavior. Analysis C&C 
can be very beneficial to expose bots and C&C servers. 
C&C detection can be Syntactic or Semantic. Syntactic C&C detection involves finding 
signature of C&C traffic and model it. Doing this manually is time-consuming and less 
reliable. Automated syntactic C&C detection proposed in the literatures [54] [55][56]. 
Semantic C&C detection involves heuristic to for associating specific behavior to C&C 
traffic. Semantic classified to Statistical, Correlation, and behavioral methods. Statistical 
methods involved in detecting C&C communication. Machine learning used to classify the 
C&C traffic. Various features used to train the classifier to detection the C&C traffic. In 
[57] machine learning used separate IRC and non-IRC traffic , then used again to detect 
C&C traffic within the IRC traffic. In correlation, the idea is similar patterns of network 
traffic could be a clue of existence of C&C traffic. Strayer et al. [41] used this method. They 
find bot-like traffic, then cluster traffic according to similarity in behavior, and 
characteristics to detect the C&C traffic. Gu et al. [40] combined this method with activity 
correlation, then they applied cross- cluster correlation to identify the botnet. In behavior 
detection of C&C traffic methods, the detection of C&C traffic done through observing the 
abnormal traffic or by comparing traffic with C&C traffic established behavioral model. 
Wurzinger et al.[55] Proposed an automatic system uses botnet running in a controlled 




A classification and identification of P2P network traffic presented in [58] [59] , both 
techniques does not consider details of application layer, [59] is a transport layer 
identification which has unidirectional traces.  
In 2009 Barsamian et al [60] proposed a framework where behavior of network traffic of 
an Ethernet network characterized. Their approach can detect changes in the botnet 
behavior and existing signatures. Based on a K-means approximation they provide a reliable 
method to detect periodic and synchronous behavior, but this technique can easily be evaded 
by using architecture for the C&C than the IRC. Liu et al [61], introduced a P2P botnet 
detection tool based on network stream analysis. Their method is grounded on three 
algorithms: (1) P2P node detection algorithm, (2) P2P node clustering algorithm, and (3) 
similarity detection algorithm. The lengthy process to identify botnets through network 
stream analysis discourages this technique to be implemented in real-time environments. 
Zhang et al. [62] proposed a detection technique for P2P botnets, using the statistical 
patterns of the network traffic. Based on the flow-clustering, they estimated the active time 
of bots. A statistical fingerprints of the P2P bots used in the detection algorithm. 
Communication patterns of P2P bots are random which consider main weakness of this 
method.  
Iliofotou et al [63] used Traffic Dispersion Graphs to monitor networks and measure its 
hosts social interaction. But this restricted to only support access layer. François et al. [64] 
observe the behavior of communication and analyze the patterns. Jiang et al. [65] monitor  




are non-scalable and the DNS failure traces are unpredictable. Ha et al. [66] made a test bed 
for P2P botnet detection and mitigation, they only focused on P2P structure botnet. 
2.1.2.3 Bot-Master Detection: 
There are four main hurdles that limit bot-master trackback researches. These four hurdles 
are a) C&C traffic between bot and bot-master considered to be low. b) Bot-master launder 
his connections by placing several logical security systems, used as authentication servers 
or what so-called “stepping stones”.  c) Usage of encryption along with stepping stones. d) 
Low-volume of C&C traffic from the bot-master [67].  
Communication between bots and bot-master of IRC-based botnet is bidirectional 
Ramsbrock et al.[67] exploited this fact and proposed an approach of watermarking 
responses from bots to bot-maser, and thus, they can eventually trace and locate bot-master. 
This approach overcome all aforementioned hurdles. This is an active detection technique 
which mean more overhead. Recently, bot-master use newer techniques to escape it.  
Z. Chi and Z. Zhao [68] said when attack command received by bots . Bots start attacking 
victim simultaneously. They proposed an approach of identifying bot-master during 
attacking the victim. Tracking back process is starting from victim reversing the path 
through routers. During identifying bot-master, malicious traffic blocked by routers. This 
algorithm has low false negative rate and low computation penalty. However, it still 




Bot-master usage of stepping stones technique to hide his trails recursively exploited by 
few proposals. However, such methods could be easily evaded by delaying packet or by 
adding meaningless packets (chaff). Zhang et al. [69] used packet timing and size to detect 
encrypted stepping-stone connection. Inter-packet timing correlation used by Wang et al. 
[70] to trace encrypted/unencrypted stepping-stone connection. Literatures [71][72] used 
timing to detect stepping-stone connection.  
2.2 BOTNET MITIGATION: 
Mitigating thread of botnet is the ultimate purpose of defending against it. Botnet mitigation 
can be before infection (precautionary) or after infection (Corrective). 
2.2.1 Precautionary:  
Precautionary means, precaution for the possibility of botnet infection. This might be 
technical or non-technical. Technical by assuring hosts and network cleanliness. 
Cleanliness can be assured by deploying OS updating, strict policies, and multi-level 
security system. Non-technical such as attacker dissuasion (through suppression finical 
motivation), user awareness (education), and legal accountability.  
2.2.2 Corrective: 
Corrective means, botnet infection recovery. Corrective can be defensive (Infection 




Defensive corrective for hosts can either by disinfecting host using off-the-shelf software, 
or OS reinstallation which is much guaranteed. In network performing defensive corrective 
is either by Bot-Block or C&C-Block.  
Offensive corrective performed by either indirect attack or direct attack on botnet. 
  Indirect attack involves reducing the usability of botnet by providing fake 
information (Passwords, bank credentials) to harm the credibility of bot-master (no 
third party to pay).  
 Direct attack involves attacking one component of a botnet (Bot, C&C channel, 
C&C server). Botnet suppression and Botnet take over are two methods for direct 
attack. Botnet suppression involves bots removal and C&C channel interference. 
Wang et al. [73] proposed a technique to target bots and remove them. Two main 
techniques used in channel interference: index poisoning technique [74], where 
command faked and injected by defender in the P2P network , and Sybil attack 
technique[75], where fake route message distributed through fake Sybille in the 






CHAPTER 3  
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION  
In this chapter we state the problem to be addressed within this thesis and we discuss the 
methodology that will be followed to achieve proposed work. 
3.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As explored in literature, most of existing botnet detection technique cannot be easily 
deployed commercially [5]. Detecting if host  is bot or not, is not an easy task [5]. Most of 
proposed detection techniques are network based. While, most infected machines around 
the world are personal computers (PCs) used by home users and are not part of local 
networks[5]. In addition, network based botnet detection techniques suffer from the 
following drawbacks [14][1].   
 Identifying the C&C traffic is very difficult task as C&C traffic is considered to be 
light compared to the legitimate traffic. 
 Minor modification on botnet, such as, C&C traffic encryption, allows it to evade 
detection.  
 Bot attacks have negligible network visible effects [1]. 





According to [1]  lots of leading botnet detection methods [15][16][6][17] can be evaded 
using simple evasive tactic such as encrypting C&C traffic. Zhang et al. [18] conclouded 
that, an effictive botnet detection methodology should relay on behavior anomaly and 
statistical analysis. 
This yields interesting insights to have Host-based botnet mitigation technique independent 
of any structure/protocol, relay on behavior anomaly and statistical analysis with high 
detection rate, law false positive rate, and not easily evadable.     
3.2. PROPOSED APPROACH AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The focus of this thesis is to develop Host-based botnet mitigation technique. We built our 
assumption on the theory that bot program installed on an end computer will have different 
traffic behavior than benign program [4].    
An experimental approach is used to find patterns on bots traffic. Experiments are based on 
observing and comparing traffic behavior of known bots, with traffic behavior of other 
benign programs. Firstly, we built a tool (PCTool) to capture each outgoing or incoming 
packets to computer and associate captured packet to process. This tool is to observe 
behavior of bot traffics in host based manner. Secondly, bot processes and benign processes 
will be executed on hosts. Captured traffic by PCTool from each computer for bot/benign 
processes will be analyzed. We rely on statistical method to extract statistics out of captured 
packet to determine behavior of malicious or benign processes. Statistics such as, Number 




Number of Remote ports through which we can distinguish behavior of bots and benign 
processes.  Then, we use these statistics as main features (or factors) of classification model 
by building SVM classifier.  Finally, classification result will be presented and discussed 







CHAPTER 4  
TOOL DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 
An experimental approach is used to find patterns of bots traffic. Our experiments are 
based on observing and comparing traffic behavior of known bots, with traffic behavior 
of other benign programs. Firstly, we built Packet Capturing Tool (PCTool) to capture 
each outgoing or incoming packets and associate captured packet to process. This tool is 
to observe behavior of bot traffics in host based manner. Secondly, we built an isolated 
network in which each host in this network is infected (is a bot) and has PCTool.  
4.1.  PCTOOL VS.1.0 DEVELOPMENT: 
We developed PCTool v.1.0 on Microsoft.net environment using C#. In order to capture 
each outgoing or incoming packets, we used SharpPcap Driver. SharpPcap is .NET 
assembly (library) for interfacing with Libpcap or Winpcap from .NET application. For 
Packet-To-Process association, we used “netstat –a –o –n” to retrieve used ports by 
running processes in system. We wrote class especially to associate retrieved Process 
IDs (PIDs) and Port Numbers from Netstat command to Process Names.  Figure 4 











4.1.1.  Common Experiments Setup 
11 Experiment were conducted to test the ability of PCTool v 1.0 and PCTool v 2.0 to 
associate traffics to malicious processes during monitoring time. We run bots in more 
than one PC just to avoid the abnormal behavior and to ensure that no misconfiguration 
in single PC. Thus, number of PCs used in experiments is not affecting results but give 
us insurance that nothing went wrong during experiments. 
12 We built an isolated network from outsider world, in which each host in this network is 
infected (is a bot). Three botnets (DDoSeR 3.0 Mod, Zeus botent, and YassinOX botnet) 
where used. These botnet are the only we could get, configure, and install.  
 DDoSeR 3.0 Mod (Botnet): 
This is a botnet tool which produces a .exe file. When .exe file executed on any other 
machine it contact server and wait command from master. The master commands, for 
example, to flood certain machine from all of its clients with certain request message. 
13 Zeus botent: 
XAMPP were used as web server in experiment. Botmaster can control bots through 
accessing this web server and browse bots in his botnet. Zeus produces an .exe file and 
when this .exe file executed on any other machine it contact server and wait command 
from botmaster. 
14 YassinOX botnet: 
Apache Server where used as web server in experiments. Botmaster can control bots 
through accessing this web server and browse bots in his botnet. YassinOX produces an 
.exe file and when this .exe file runs on any other machine it becomes zombie. This tool 





4.1.2.  Testing PCTool v 1.0  
We conducted three experiments to test this version of PCTool. We separately deployed 
three real botnets in isolated environment. These experiments, are to see ability of 
PCTool vs.1.0 in capturing and associating traffic of both malicious and benign 
processes. We run bots in more than one PC just to avoid abnormal behavior or 
misconfiguration in single PC. Thus, number of PCs used in experiments is not affecting 
results but give us insurance that nothing went wrong during experiments.  
We used additional tool we designed to reveal processes in these experiments: 
 Process Reveal Tool: 
We designed this tool to show all processes currently running on a given machine and 
store this information into text file. 
Purpose of using it is to compare list of processes in given machine before and after it 
got infected with bot. 
4.1.2.1. First Experiment Setup: 
We installed Packet Capturing Tool and Process Reveal Tool on all machines (7 PCs).  
DDoSeR 3.0 Mod was installed on PC-1 (IP 192.168.2.1) where .EXE (bot) file 
built.EXE file executed on remaining machines (PC-2 … PC-5, PC-7, and PC-8).  
 
IP addresses of PCs as following: 




PC-2 / 192.168.2.2 
PC-3 / 192.168.2.3 
PC-4 / 192.168.2.4 
PC-5 / 192.168.2.5 
PC-6 / 192.168.2.6 
PC-7 / 192.168.2.7 
PC-8 / 192.168.2.8 
Last digit of IP is same as in PC name. Figure 5 shows behavior of bot in experiment 1. 
In addition, it give us clear view about the ability of PCTool v1.0 to associate traffic 
packets to initiated or received process which in this experiment a process of DDOSER 
.3.0 mod. The x-axis of figures representing number of packets associated to process of 
DDOSER, and the y-axis is representing monitoring time. We found all figures from all 
PCs are alike, so we are adding only a figure below. 
From figures below, we can say that PCTool v1.0 is being able to associate traffic during 
all the monitoring time or it failed to do. Conclusion and discussion of this experiment 




















4.1.2.2. Second Experiment Setup: 
We installed Packet Capturing Tool and Process Reveal Tool on all machine (6 PCs). 
XAMPP and Zeus Bot-master was installed and Configured on PC-3 (172.1.0.3) where 
.EXE file built. EXE file executed on remaining machines (PC-2, PC-4, PC-5, PC-6, and 
PC-8).  
 
IP addresses of PCs as following: 
PC-2 / 172.16.0.2 
PC-3 / 172.16.0.3 
PC-4 / 172.16.0.4 
PC-5 / 172.16.0.5 
PC-6 / 172.16.0.6 
PC-7 / 172.16.0.7 
PC-8 / 172.16.0.8 
Last digit of IP is same as in PC name. Figure 6 shows behavior of bot in experiment 2. 
In addition, it give us clear view about the ability of PCTool v1.0 to associate traffic 
packets to initiated or received process which in this experiment  process of Zeus Botnet. 
The x-axis of figures representing number of packets associated to process, and the y-
axis is representing monitoring time. We found all figures from all PCs are alike, so we 




From figure below, we can say that PCTool v1.0 is being able to associate traffic during 










4.1.2.3. Third Experiment Setup: 
We installed Packet Capturing Tool and Process Reveal Tool on all machine (7 PCs).  
Apache Server and YassinOX Bot-master was installed and Configured on PC-4 
(172.1.0.4) where .EXE file built. EXE file executed on remaining machines (PC-1, PC-
2, PC-3, PC-5, PC-6, PC-7, and PC-8).  
 
IP addresses of PCs as following: 
PC-1 / 172.16.0.1 
PC-2 / 172.16.0.2 
PC-3 / 172.16.0.3 
PC-4 / 172.16.0.4 
PC-5 / 172.16.0.5 
PC-6 / 172.16.0.6 
PC-7 / 172.16.0.7 
PC-8 / 172.16.0.8 
Last digit of IPs are same as in PC name. Figure 13 shows behavior of bot in experiment 
3.  Notice, we just draw graphs for one PC (PC-1). PCTool vs.1.0 could not associate 
packets to bot process. This issue detailed in discussion (section 4.1.3) of PCTool vs.1.0.  












As figure 4 shows how PCTool vs.1.0 works, and after we did deeper analysis, tool failed 
to associate captured packet to a live process in certain situations such as: 
1. If malicious process keeps changing its port number frequently. Where, PCTool 
vs.1.0 extract port numbers from header of packet arrived, and match it with 
retrieved port numbers of alive processes in system, but, retrieved port numbers 
might be expired. 
    
2. If inter-arrival speed of packets is higher than processing speed. Where, PCTool 
vs.1.0 takes long time to write processed data (Process ID, Process Name, Port 
No., and Packet details) to text file in hard disk.  
In following, we will explain and discuss why outcome of the three experiments was as 
in figures 5-13. 
4.1.3.1. First Experiment: 
Despite drawbacks of PCTool vs.1.0, we did not notice or record any failure in this 
experiment run. We believe this is due to following: 
 Botnet used has very low packet inter-arrival rate. It only sends two packets and 
receives one packet every two seconds. Thus, procedures of packet-to-process 
associating, and writing process-packet details into text file in hard disk are higher  
rate than packet inter-arrival rate.  
 
 Bot process is not changing its port number at any time during run of the experiment.  
This can explain why figures 5-9 show good performance where, all packets associated 




4.1.3.2. Second experiment: 
In this experiment we slightly noticed some of drawbacks of PCTool vs.1.0. Though, it 
did not affects results and remained acceptable.  This could be Due to following reasons: 
 Zeus botnet has higher packets inter-arrival rate than botnet used in first experiment. 
Yet, PCTool vs.1.0 can associate 75% of packets. See figures 10-12. 
 Zeus bot process also does not change its port number at any time during run of the 
experiment. 
 
This can explain why the figures 10-12 show an acceptable detection of behavior of 
Zeus bot since about 75% of packets are associated to their processes. 
4.1.3.3. Third experiment: 
In this experiment, we noticed a poor performance of PCTool vs.1.0. We believe this is 
due to following: 
 YassinOX botnet has higher packets inter-arrival rate than botnets used in first and 
second experiments. 








4.1.3.4. Discussion summary: 








 Small PKT inter-arrival rate. 
 Port No. Not changing. 
 
Second Acceptable 
 Higher PKT inter-arrival rate. 
 Port No. Not changing 
 
Third Poor 
 Very high PKT inter-arrival 
rate. 
 Port No. frequently changing 






4.2.  PCTOOL VS.2.0 DEVELOPMENT: 
In this version of PCTool, we tried to overcome issues of PCToolvs.1.0 examined, and 
discussed in section 4.1.2. In order to do that, we changed the design of the tool. As 
shown in figure 14, we exploited multi-threading concept. Three threads were used, they 
integrate each other, and each of which has certain tasks. 
4.2.1. Thread (1):  
This thread solves the issue of writing processed data directly to text file in hard disk. 
Instead, it will write data into memory structure. In this case, “a queue”. The queue is 
for temporary storage of process’s data, where it cleaned frequently by thread (2).    
Thread (1) Tasks: 
 Captures every outgoing\incoming network packet. 
 Associates captured packet with its process using updated list of alive processes 
provided by thread (3). 
 Add processed data to the queue. 
4.2.2. Thread (2): 
This thread starts at the same time thread (1) starts. Thread (2) is an infinite loop that 
reads and empty –to avoid queue overflow- the queue filled by thread (1), and then, 
writes to hard disk where text file located. We assume that computation speed is way 




4.2.3. Thread (3): 
This thread solves delay issue of getting port numbers of running processes. The only 
task of thread (3) is updating list of alive processes in PCToolvs.2.0 frequently. The list 
updated every 10 millisecond. We also tried 100 millisecond to update the process list. 
We found no difference in performance. So we kept the smallest which is 10 
milliseconds. 
Experiment in section 4.1.2.3 conducted once again using PCToolvs.2.0. We gathered 
information from each computer and analyzed bot traffic behavior. In following we will 














4.2.4.  Experiment Setup:  
This experiment is to test the ability of PCTool v 2.0 to associate traffics to YassinOX 
process during monitoring time. We run bots in more than one PC just to avoid the 
abnormal behavior and to ensure that no misconfiguration in single PC. 
We installed Packet Capturing Tool and Process Reveal Tool on all machines (4 
PCs).  
Apache Server and YassinOX Bot-master was installed and Configured on PC-4 
(172.1.0.4) where .EXE file built. 
EXE file executed on remaining machines (PC-5, PC-6, PC-7, and PC-8).  
IP addresses of e PCs as following: 
PC-5 / 172.16.0.5 
.PC-8 / 172.16.0.8 
Last digit of IP is e same as in PC name. Figure 9 show behavior of bot in this experiment. 
Notice, we can see big improvement in PCTool vs.2.0. Especially, where PCTool vs.1.0 
could not associate packets to same bot (YassinOX) process, see section 4.1.2.3, but 
PCTool vs.2.0 showed good performance. We found all figures from all PCs are alike, 














With PCTool vs.2.0, we believe that we overcame situations where PCTool vs.1.0 
examined failure to associate captured packet to a live process, see section 4.2.4. From 
now on this PCTool will refer to PCTool vs.2.0. 
4.2.6. Data set: 
After testing our tool (PCTool), we conducted experiment with same setup as in above 
experiments to collect data set. Botnets used in previous experiments installed in 
machines.  In addition, various benign application has been installed as well such as, 
Mozilla firefox, google chrome, skype, tribler (torrent), and Bitcommt(torrent).  
Both malicious and benign application executed while machines monitored using 
PCTool. MATLAB code used to perform statistical analysis on collected data from 
PCTool. Output of the MATLAB code formed statistical features that used as 






CHAPTER 5  
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
We chose experimental approach to find patterns of bots traffic. Experiments are based on 
observing and comparing traffic behavior of known bots, with traffic behavior of other 
benign programs. Firstly, we built Packet Capturing Tool (PCTool) to capture each 
outgoing or incoming packets to computer and associate captured packet to process. This 
tool is to observe behavior of bot traffics in host-based manner. Secondly, we built an 
isolated network, in which each host in this network is infected (is a bot) and has PCTool 
installed. Three botnets (DDoSeR 3.0 Mod, Zeus botent, and YassinOX botnet) where used. 
Botnets detailed in section 4.1.1. 
As study of Zhang et al. [18] concluded that an effective botnet detection methodology 
should rely on behavior anomaly, statistical analysis, and independent of any 
structure/protocol. In our work, machine learning was not used for features extraction. 
Instead,  we rely on statistical method to extract statistics out of captured packets using our 
MATLAB code. Output of the MATLAB code formed statistical features that used as 
classification factors for SVM classification model to determine behavior of malicious or 
benign processes. Then, we use these statistics as main features (or factors) of classification 
model by building SVM classifier. We have six features:  1) period of time (ΔT), 2) Number 
of Packets Sent, 3) Number of Packets Received, 4) Number of IPs, 5) Number of Local 




We assumed that, depending on only these six features we can classify malicious and benign 
traffic. Table 2 shows sample of features, each line in table is resampling one period of time 
(1 ΔT). Ranges of ΔT are set for each run of experiment.  
PID ΔT 
No. of Pkts 
Sent 









3152 100 55 39 4 2 6 0 
1732 200 6 5 2 4 3 1 






5.1.  MALICIOUS - BENIGN PROCESS CLASSIFICATION: 
Classification is a way to predict labels of class for a given data input. In our work we are 
doing binary classification, with two possible output classes’ malicious process or benign 
process. 
In machine learning code we use SVM as our classifier, and radial basis function (RBF) 
[76], as kernel function. K-folds cross validation [77] was used in our experiment, where 
dataset randomly broken into k partitions (or folds). One fold taken for testing, remaining 
folds for training. The model should run for K times. In each run, testing part is changing. 
For instance, in first run last part (k) is for testing rest parts for training, in second run part 
(k-1) is for testing and rest parts are for training… etc. see figure 17. In our work we 







Figure 10: Illustration of how data divided to K parts (K=10), each part. One part for testing 
and other 9 parts are for training. We run the model for k times. In each run, the testing 






5.2.  EVALUATION METRICS: 
After the ten runs of our classification model are done. We need to show how the classifier 
can separate malicious process from normal process. There are many ways to show 
classifier performance. Confusion Matrix and Area under the Curve (AUC) are well-
known classification performance measuring metrics [79]. In order to find AUC, we need 
to plot receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.  
In sections 5.2.1, and 5.2.2 we will give brief explanation of AUC of ROC curve, and 
confusion matrix. 
5.2.1.  Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve: 
ROC curve is a graphic plotting to illustrate binary classifier performance as its cut-point 
(or Discrimination threshold) varied. ROC curve presented graphically by plotting 
sensitivity (TPR) against 1-specificity (FPR) of classifier at various cut-point settings.  
ROC curve is a whole curve. It provides a subtle difference in details about behavior of 
classifier, but it’s hard to quickly compare many ROC curves to each other. Machine would 
need quantifiable score instead of plot that requires visual inspection. AUC is one way to 






5.2.2. Area under the Curve (AUC):  
Area under the ROC Curve is a measurement of accuracy of binary classifier. A perfect 
classifier represented with area of 1 (100%), while worthless classifier represented with 0.5 
(50%) of area or less [80] [81].  A guide for categorizing accuracy of classifier is illustrated 
in table 3. 
5.2.3. Confusion matrix:  
Confusion matrix contains information about actual and predicted classifications done by a 
classification system. Performance of such systems is commonly evaluated using data in 
the matrix. Table 4 shows confusion matrix for two class classifier. 
 Predicted ( P ) Predicted ( N ) 
Actual (  P ) True Positive ( TP ) False Negative ( FN ) 
Actual ( N ) False Positive ( FP ) True Negative ( TN ) 
Table 4: Contingency table show the arrangement of TP, FP, FN, and TN which are 
the output of the confusion matrix 
 
 
Table 3: A guide for classifying accuracy 
Accuracy Fail Poor Fair Good Excellent 




In predictive analytics, contingency table (or confusion matrix) reports number of true 
positives, false positives, false negatives, true positives, and true negatives to allow precise 
analysis. When using K-folds cross-validation TP, FP, FN, and TN are computed 
respectively by the following equations: 
 
Metric Name Equations Location in confusion matrix 
T r u e  P o s i t i v e  







 ( 1 , 1 ) 
F a l s e  P o s i t i v e  






 ( 2 , 1 ) 






 ( 1 , 2 ) 






 ( 2 , 2 ) 
Table 5: how to calculate TP, FP, FN, and TN 
 
Where k is number of folds used in training and testing model. Then, True Positives Rate 
(TPR), False Positives Rate (FPR), False Negatives Rate (FNR), and True negatives Rate 







Metric Name Equations 

















   𝑜𝑟  FNR =  1 − TPR 





5.3.  RESULTS: 
In this section, we present our experimentation results of the proposed malicious - benign 
process classification technique. We tested the classification model for various ranges of 
ΔT. Our target is to get excellent AUC with the smallest ΔT and FPR less than 1 %. Keeping 
FPR very low means very less benign application detected as bot. FNR representing bot 
process detected as benign which something tolerable and does not affect users.  
We started with, nine ΔT ranges starting from 100 Milliseconds to 4500 milliseconds. The 
100 Milliseconds is only the smallest period of time we will check the accuracy of our 
classifier in. Periods will start from 100, 200, 300… 4500. The aim is to find smallest period 
that achieves the lowest FBR. Each ΔT range consist of 5 steps where each step is 100 
milliseconds. In following, we show results and figures for various ΔT ranges. 
5.3.1. ΔT = 100-500 Milliseconds:  
In first range where ΔT vary from100 – 500 milliseconds.  Ten-fold cross validation was 
used in the classification model. Plotting of ROC curves are showing in figures 18 - 27 as 
testing fold varying from one to ten. As we explained in section 5.2.1, AUC is the best way 








































Table 7: Summary of AUCs for Ten-Folds where ΔT = 100 - 500 
 
AUC of all Ks in ROC curves is summarized with mean AUC (60.31 %). According to 
accuracy guide of AUC (see table 3) the classification model almost fail in range of ΔT = 
100 – 500 milliseconds. 
Confusion matrix used as another evaluation criteria. Equations in table 5 used to compute 
TP, FP, FN, and TN. Accordingly, we can use equations in table 6 to find:  True Positive 




(TNR) as shown in table 8, where FBR is 99.8% and that considered failure of the 
classification model. Both metric showed same results. 
ΔT TPR FPR FNR TNR 
100-500 99.8% 99.8% 0.18% 0.19% 






Figure 11: ROC Curve when ΔT = 100-
500 Millisecond , and K=1 
 
Figure 12: ROC Curve when ΔT = 100-
500 Millisecond, and K=2 
 
Figure 13: ROC Curve when ΔT = 100-
500 Millisecond, and K=3 
 
Figure 14: ROC Curve when ΔT = 100-





Figure 15: ROC Curve when ΔT = 100-
500 Millisecond, and K=5 
 
Figure 16: ROC Curve when ΔT = 100-
500 Millisecond, and K=6 
 
Figure 17: ROC Curve when ΔT = 100-
500 Millisecond, and K=7 
 
Figure 18: ROC Curve when ΔT = 100-






Figure 19: ROC Curve when ΔT = 100-500 
Millisecond , and K=9 
 
Figure 20: ROC Curve when ΔT = 100-500 





5.3.2. ΔT = 600-1000 Milliseconds:  
In the second range where ΔT vary from600 – 1000 milliseconds.  Ten-fold cross validation 
was used in the classification model. Plotting of ROC curves are showing in figures 28 - 37 
as testing fold varying from one to ten. As we explained in section 5.2.1, AUC is the best 
way to summarize and compare ROC curves. Table 9 shows AUCs of figures 28-37. 
































Table 9: Summary of AUCs for Ten-Folds where ΔT = 600 - 1000 
 
AUC of all Ks in ROC curves is summarized with mean AUC (51.92%). According to 
accuracy guide of AUC (see table 3) the classification model fail in the range of ΔT = 600 





Confusion matrix used as another evaluation criteria. Equations in table 5 used to compute 
TP, FP, FN, and TN. According, we can use equations in table 6 to find:  True Positive Rate 
(TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), and True Negative Rate 
(TNR) as shown in table 10, where FBR is 66.1% and that considered failure of the 
classification model. Both metric showed same results. 
 
ΔT TPR FPR FNR TNR 
600-1000 97% 66.1% 3.02% 33.8% 





Figure 21: ROC Curve when ΔT = 600-
1000 milliseconds , and K=1 
 
Figure 22: ROC Curve when ΔT = 600-
1000 milliseconds, and K=2 
 
Figure 23: ROC Curve when ΔT = 600-
1000 milliseconds, and K=3 
 
Figure 24: ROC Curve when ΔT = 600-





Figure 25: ROC Curve when ΔT = 600-
1000 milliseconds, and K=5 
 
Figure 26: ROC Curve when ΔT = 600-
1000 milliseconds, and K=6 
 
Figure 27: ROC Curve when ΔT = 600-
1000 milliseconds, and K=7 
 
Figure 28: ROC Curve when ΔT = 600-





Figure 29: ROC Curve when ΔT = 600-
1000 milliseconds, and K=9 
 
Figure 30: ROC Curve when ΔT = 600-





5.3.3. ΔT = 1100-1500 Milliseconds:  
In the third range where ΔT vary from 1100 – 1500 milliseconds.  Ten-fold cross validation 
was used in the classification model. Plotting of ROC curves are showing in figures 38 - 47 
as testing fold varying from one to ten. As we explained in section 5.2.1, AUC is the best 
way to summarize and compare ROC curves. Table 11 shows AUCs of figures 38-47. 
 





































AUC of all Ks in ROC curves is summarized with mean AUC (68.2%). According to 
accuracy guide of AUC (see table 3) the classification model performed poorly in the range 
of ΔT = 1100 – 1500 milliseconds. 
 
Confusion matrix used as another evaluation criteria. Equations in table 5 used to compute 
TP, FP, FN, and TN. According, we can use equations in table 6 to find:  True Positive Rate 
(TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), and True Negative Rate 
(TNR) as shown in table 12, where FBR is 38.2% and that considered a poor performance 
of the classification model. Both metric are almost on the same line.  
 
ΔT TPR FPR FNR TNR 
1100-1500 95.73% 38.2% 4.2% 61.8% 







Figure 31: ROC Curve when ΔT = 1100-
1500 milliseconds , and K=1 
 
Figure 32: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
1100-1500 milliseconds, and K=2 
 
Figure 33: ROC Curve when ΔT = 1100-
1500 milliseconds, and K=3 
 
Figure 34: ROC Curve when ΔT = 





Figure 35: ROC Curve when ΔT = 1100-
1500 milliseconds, and K=5 
 
Figure 36: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
1100-1500 milliseconds, and K=6 
 
Figure 37: ROC Curve when ΔT = 1100-
1500 milliseconds, and K=7 
 
Figure 38: ROC Curve when ΔT = 





Figure 39: ROC Curve when ΔT = 1100-
1500 milliseconds, and K=9 
 
Figure 40: ROC Curve when ΔT = 








5.3.4. ΔT = 1600-2000 Milliseconds:  
In the fourth range where ΔT vary from 1600 – 2000 milliseconds.  Ten-fold cross 
validation was used in the classification model. Plotting of ROC curves are showing in 
figures 48 - 57 as testing fold varying from one to ten. As we explained in section 5.2.1, 
AUC is the best way to summarize and compare ROC curves. Table 13 shows AUCs of 
figures 48 - 57. 
 





































AUC of all Ks in ROC curves is summarized with mean AUC (89.2%). According to 
accuracy guide of AUC (see table 3) the classification model showed good (almost 
excellent) performance in the range of ΔT = 1600 – 2000 milliseconds. 
 
Confusion matrix used as another evaluation criteria. Equations in table 5 used to compute 
TP, FP, FN, and TN. According, we can use equations in table 6 to find:  True Positive Rate 
(TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), and True Negative Rate 
(TNR) as shown in table 14, where FBR is 10.14 % and that considered a good improvement 
of the classification model. Both metric are almost on the same line.  
 
ΔT TPR FPR FNR TNR 
1600-2000 95.05% 10.14% 4.94% 89.86% 







Figure 41: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
1600-2000 milliseconds , and K=1 
 
Figure 42: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
1600-2000 milliseconds, and K=2 
 
Figure 43: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
1600-2000 milliseconds, and K=3 
 
Figure 44: ROC Curve when ΔT = 





Figure 45: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
1600-2000 milliseconds, and K=5 
 
Figure 46: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
1600-2000 milliseconds, and K=6 
 
Figure 47: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
1600-2000 milliseconds, and K=7 
 
Figure 48: ROC Curve when ΔT = 





Figure 49: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
1600-2000 milliseconds, and K=9 
 
Figure 50: ROC Curve when ΔT = 







5.3.5. ΔT = 2100-2500 Milliseconds:  
In the fifth range where ΔT vary from 2100 – 2500 milliseconds.  Ten-fold cross validation 
was used in the classification model. Plotting of ROC curves are showing in figures 58 - 67 
as testing fold varying from one to ten. As we explained in section 5.2.1, AUC is the best 
way to summarize and compare ROC curves. Table 15 shows AUCs of figures 58 - 67. 
 





































AUC of all Ks in ROC curves is summarized with mean AUC (87.35%). According to 
accuracy guide of AUC (see table 3) the classification model showed good performance in 
the range of ΔT = 2100 – 2500 milliseconds with no improvement from previous range. 
 
Confusion matrix used as another evaluation criteria. Equations in table 5 used to compute 
TP, FP, FN, and TN. According, we can use equations in table 6 to find:  True Positive Rate 
(TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), and True Negative Rate 
(TNR) as shown in table 16, where FBR is 12.51% and that considered a good but with no 
improvement of the classification model from previous range. Both metric are almost on 
the same line  
 
ΔT TPR FPR FNR TNR 
2100-2500 95.17% 12.51% 4.82% 87.48% 







Figure 51: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
2100-2500 milliseconds , and K=1 
 
Figure 52: ROC Curve when ΔT = 2100-
2500 milliseconds, and K=2 
 
Figure 53: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
2100-2500 milliseconds, and K=3 
 
Figure 54: ROC Curve when ΔT = 2100-





Figure 55: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
2100-2500 milliseconds, and K=5 
 
Figure 56: ROC Curve when ΔT = 2100-
2500 milliseconds, and K=6 
 
Figure 57: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
2100-2500 milliseconds, and K=7 
 
Figure 58: ROC Curve when ΔT = 2100-





Figure 59: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
2100-2500 milliseconds, and K=9 
 
Figure 60: ROC Curve when ΔT = 2100-








5.3.6. ΔT = 2600-3000 Milliseconds:  
In the sixth range where ΔT vary from 2600 – 3000 milliseconds.  Ten-fold cross validation 
was used in the classification model. Plotting of ROC curves are showing in figures 68 - 77 
as testing fold varying from one to ten. As we explained in section 5.2.1, AUC is the best 
way to summarize and compare ROC curves. Table 17 shows AUCs of figures 68 - 77. 
 





































AUC of all Ks in ROC curves is summarized with mean AUC (91.33%). According to 
accuracy guide of AUC (see table 3) the classification model showed excellent performance 
in the range of ΔT = 2600 – 3000 milliseconds. 
 
Confusion matrix used as another evaluation criteria. Equations in table 5 used to compute 
TP, FP, FN, and TN. According, we can use equations in table 6  to find:  True Positive 
Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), and True Negative Rate 
(TNR) as shown in table 18, where FBR is 6.91 % and that considered a excellent 
performance of the classification model but not yet reaching our target. Both metric are 
almost on the same line 
 
ΔT TPR FPR FNR TNR 
2600-3000 94.95% 6.91% 5.04% 93.09% 







Figure 61: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
2600-3000 milliseconds , and K=1 
 
Figure 62: ROC Curve when ΔT = 2600-
3000 milliseconds, and K=2 
 
Figure 63: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
2600-3000 milliseconds, and K=3 
 
Figure 64: ROC Curve when ΔT = 2600-





Figure 65: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
2600-3000 milliseconds, and K=5 
 
Figure 66: ROC Curve when ΔT = 2600-
3000 milliseconds, and K=6 
 
Figure 67: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
2600-3000 milliseconds, and K=7 
 
Figure 68: ROC Curve when ΔT = 2600-





Figure 69: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
2600-3000 milliseconds, and K=9 
 
Figure 70: ROC Curve when ΔT = 2600-










5.3.7. ΔT = 3100-3500 Milliseconds:  
In the seventh range where ΔT vary from 3100 – 3500 milliseconds.  Ten-fold cross 
validation was used in the classification model. Plotting of ROC curves are showing in 
figures 78 - 87 as testing fold varying from one to ten. As we explained in section 5.2.1, 
AUC is the best way to summarize and compare ROC curves. Table 19 shows AUCs of 
figures 78 - 87. 
 





































AUC of all Ks in ROC curves is summarized with mean AUC (92.73%). According to 
accuracy guide of AUC (see table 3) the classification model showed excellent performance 
in the range of ΔT = 3100 – 3500 milliseconds. 
 
Confusion matrix used as another evaluation criteria. Equations in table 5 used to compute 
TP, FP, FN, and TN. According, we can use equations in table 6 to find:  True Positive Rate 
(TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), and True Negative Rate 
(TNR) as shown in table 20, where FBR is 6.91 % and that considered an excellent 
performance of the classification model with no improvement from previous range and yet 
not reaching our target. Both metric are almost on the same line  
 
ΔT TPR FPR FNR TNR 
3100-3500 94.81% 6.91% 5.18% 94.53% 







Figure 71: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3100-3500 milliseconds , and K=1 
 
Figure 72: ROC Curve when ΔT = 3100-
3500 milliseconds, and K=2 
 
Figure 73: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3100-3500 milliseconds, and K=3 
 
Figure 74: ROC Curve when ΔT = 3100-





Figure 75: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3100-3500 milliseconds, and K=5 
 
Figure 76: ROC Curve when ΔT = 3100-
3500 milliseconds, and K=6 
 
Figure 77: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3100-3500 milliseconds, and K=7 
 
Figure 78: ROC Curve when ΔT = 3100-





Figure 79: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3100-3500 milliseconds, and K=9 
 
Figure 80: ROC Curve when ΔT = 3100-










5.3.8. ΔT = 3600-4000 Milliseconds:  
In the eighth range where ΔT vary from 3600 – 4000 milliseconds.  Ten-fold cross 
validation was used in the classification model. Plotting of ROC curves are showing in 
figures 88 - 97 as testing fold varying from one to ten. As we explained in section 5.2.1, 
AUC is the best way to summarize and compare ROC curves. Table 21 shows AUCs of 
figures 88 - 97. 
 





































AUC of all Ks in ROC curves is summarized with mean AUC (96.63%). According to 
accuracy guide of AUC (see table 3) the classification model showed excellent performance 
in the range of ΔT = 3600 – 4000 milliseconds. 
 
Confusion matrix used as another evaluation criteria. Equations in table 5 used to compute 
TP, FP, FN, and TN. According, we can use equations in table 6 to find:  True Positive Rate 
(TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), and True Negative Rate 
(TNR) as shown in table 22, where FBR is 1.067 % and that considered an excellent 
performance of the classification model with improvement from previous range but yet not 
reaching our target. Both metric are almost on the same line  
 
ΔT TPR FPR FNR TNR 
3600-4000 94.48% 1.067% 5.528% 98.93% 







Figure 81: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3600-4000 milliseconds , and K=1 
 
Figure 82: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3600-4000 milliseconds, and K=2 
 
Figure 83: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3600-4000 milliseconds, and K=3 
 
Figure 84: ROC Curve when ΔT = 





Figure 85: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3600-4000 milliseconds, and K=5 
 
Figure 86: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3600-4000 milliseconds, and K=6 
 
Figure 87: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3600-4000 milliseconds, and K=7 
 
Figure 88: ROC Curve when ΔT = 





Figure 89: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
3600-4000 milliseconds, and K=9 
 
Figure 90: ROC Curve when ΔT = 









5.3.9. ΔT = 4100-4500 Milliseconds:  
In the ninth range where ΔT vary from 4100 – 4500 milliseconds.  Ten-fold cross validation 
was used in the classification model. Plotting of ROC curves are showing in figures 98 - 
107 as testing fold varying from one to ten. As we explained in section 5.2.1, AUC is the 
best way to summarize and compare ROC curves. Table 23 shows AUCs of figures 98 - 
107. 
 





































AUC of all Ks in ROC curves is summarized with mean AUC (97.01 %). According to 
accuracy guide of AUC (see table 3) the classification model showed excellent performance 
in the range of ΔT = 4100 – 4500 milliseconds. 
 
Confusion matrix used as another evaluation criteria. Equations in table 5 used to compute 
TP, FP, FN, and TN. According, we can use equations in table 6 to find:  True Positive Rate 
(TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), and True Negative Rate 
(TNR) as shown in table 24 where FBR is 0.14 % and that considered an excellent 
performance of the classification model with improvement from previous range and that 
fulfill our target. Both metric are almost on the same line 
 
ΔT TPR FPR FNR TNR 
4100-4500 94.11% 0.14% 5.89% 99.85% 







Figure 91: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
4100-4500 milliseconds , and K=1 
 
Figure 92: ROC Curve when ΔT = 4100-
4500 milliseconds, and K=2 
 
Figure 93: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
4100-4500 milliseconds, and K=3 
 
Figure 94: ROC Curve when ΔT = 4100-





Figure 95: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
4100-4500 milliseconds, and K=5 
 
Figure 96: ROC Curve when ΔT = 4100-
4500 milliseconds, and K=6 
 
Figure 97: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
4100-4500 milliseconds, and K=7 
 
Figure 98: ROC Curve when ΔT = 4100-





Figure 99: ROC Curve when ΔT = 
4100-4500 milliseconds, and K=9 
 
Figure 100: ROC Curve when ΔT = 










5.4.   SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION: 
In this section we will summarize and discuss experiments results showed in section 5.3. 
Form results, we found that as ΔT increases, accuracy and performance of our classification 
model increase. Table 25 shows, the produced results using AUC of ROC curve and 
confusion matrix evaluation criteria where ΔT vary from 100 milliseconds to 4500 
milliseconds. 
For ΔT in the ranges “100 -500”, and “600 – 1000” classification model failed for AUC of 
ROC curve and confusion matrix evaluation criteria. AUC showed failure percentage in 
both ranges. False Positive Rates was very high (nearly 100%). 
For ΔT  in the range “1100 -1500”, classification model performed poorly for both criteria. 
AUC showed poor performance and FPR showed a little bit improvement, but still 
considered to be high (nearly 40%). 
For ΔT in the ranges “1600 -2000”, and “2100 – 2500” classification model showed good 
performance for both criteria. AUC in both ranges fall in the good category of AUC guide 
(see table 3). Comparing to above ranges FPR showed proportional improvement (nearly 
11.32%).  
For ΔT in the ranges “2600 -3000”, and “3100 – 3500” classification model showed 
excellent performance for both criteria. AUC in both ranges fall in the excellent category 
of AUC guide (see table 3). Comparing to above ranges FPR showed proportional 





For ΔT in the ranges “3600 -4000”, and “4100 – 4500” classification model showed very 
excellent performance for both criteria. AUC in both ranges fall in the excellent category 
of AUC guide (see table 3). For both ranges, FPR showed tremendous improvement (1.067 
% and 0.14 %).  
Confusion Matrix ROC Curve 
Range of 
ΔT 
TPR FPR FNR TNR AUC 
100   -  500 99.8% 99.8% 0.18% 0.19% 60.31% 
600   -  1000 97% 66.1% 3.02% 33.8% 51.92% 
1100 -  1500 95.73% 38.2% 4.2% 61.8% 68.2% 
1600 -  2000 95.05% 10.14% 4.94% 89.86% 89.2% 
2100 -  2500 95.17% 12.51% 4.82% 87.48% 87.35% 
2600 -  3000 94.95% 6.91% 5.04% 93.09% 91.33% 
3100 -  3500 94.81% 6.91% 5.18% 94.53% 92.73% 
3600 -  4000 94.48% 1.067% 5.528% 98.93% 96.63% 
4100 -  4500 94.11% 0.14% 5.89% 99.85% 97.01% 
As shown above, when ΔT increases behavior of malicious and benign processes can be 
distinguished by the classification model with very low false positive rate where the 
difference in activities becomes more obvious. In contrast, for small ΔT, behavior of 
malicious and benign processes cannot be distinguished and classification model showed 
poor performance and random classification. This confirm the theory we followed in this 
research that bot program installed on end computer will have different outgoing and 
incoming traffic behavior than benign program. 
Table 25:  Summary of results using AUC of ROC curve and confusion matrix evaluation 




However, in order to pick up the exact smallest ΔT that achieves the lowest FBR (below 
1%) we cannot depend on range of ΔTs where dataset will differ from range to another. 
Thus, results range will not be accurate. So, we tested random ΔTs (1000, 2000, and 3000 
milliseconds) to just give us big picture from where to start finding smallest ΔT. As shown 
in table 26 smallest ΔT shall be around the 3000 milliseconds. 
 
 
We started from ΔT=2500 millisecond till ΔT= 3300 milliseconds as shown in table 27. 
According to the table, smallest ΔT that achieves the lowest FBR (below 1%) is 2800 
milliseconds where FBR is 0.13% and AUC is 97.12%.  
  
Confusion Matrix ROC Curve  Con. Int 
ΔT TPR FPR TNR FNR AUC - 
1000 94.69 % 29.79 % 70.20 % 5.30 % 80.43 % +/-  20.04 
2000 95.13 % 3.56 % 96.43 % 4.86 % 95.53 % +/-   5.07 
3000 94.87 % 0.13 % 99.86 % 5.13 % 97.13 % +/-   0.62 
4000 94.30 % 0.14 % 99.85 % 5.69 % 96.54 % +/-  0.88 
Table 26: Results using AUC of ROC curve and confusion matrix evaluation criteria 








 Con. Int 
ΔT TPR FPR TNR FNR AUC - 
2500 94.98% 3.34% 96.65% 5.01% 95.13% +/- 5.40 
2600 94.92% 3.33% 96.66% 5.07% 95.12% +/-  5.38 
2700 94.79% 3.30% 96.69% 5.20% 95.14% +/-  5.41 
2800 94.93% 0.13% 99.86% 5.06% 97.12% +/-  0.59 
2900 94.84% 0.13% 99.86% 5.15% 97.44% +/-  0.8 
3000 94.87 % 0.13% 99.86 % 5.13 % 97.13 % +/-  0.62 
3100 94.86% 0.13% 99.86% 5.13% 96.95% +/-  0.7 
3200 94.80% 0.13% 99.86% 5.19% 96.86% +/- 0.658 
3300 94.73% 0.13% 99.86% 5.26% 96.84% +/- 0.613 
 
 
Table 27: Results using AUC of ROC curve and confusion matrix evaluation criteria 




CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
6.1. SUMMARY 
In this thesis, many of existing botnet detection techniques are reviewed. Most of these 
techniques are network-based and few of which were host-based botnet detection 
techniques. Most of reviewed host-based detection techniques rely on observing bot system 
calls, event logs and/or registry modifications. 
 In contrast, in this thesis, we introduced Host-based botnet detection technique relying on 
observing network traffic of bot in local machine.  We developed special tool to capture 
outgoing and incoming network traffic and associate it with process in local machine. We 
named it PCTool. MATLAB code used to collect statistics of captured traffic. Statistics 
were used as main features to train RBF-SVM.  
Confusion Matrix and Area under the Curve (AUC) were used as the classification 
performance measuring metrics. RBF-SVM classification model showed very excellent 
performance for both criteria. According to accuracy guide of AUC, the classification 
model showed excellent performance where AUC = 97.01 %. For the other metric, 




In experiments, ΔT vary from 100 milliseconds to 4500 milliseconds. We found that as ΔT 
increases behavior of malicious and benign processes can be distinguished by the 
classification model with very low false positive rate. In contrast, as ΔT decreased, behavior 
of malicious and benign processes cannot be distinguished and classification model showed 
poor performance and random classification.   
6.2. FUTURE WORK 
Many issues need more investigation in addition to what we done in this thesis as following: 
 We used limited number of botnets to build our data set. Large dataset for various 
botnets needed to be built using PCTool, Such project will help researchers. 
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